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Abstract
This paper provides a su±cient condition for existence and uniqueness of equilib-
rium, which is in monotone pure strategies, in games of incomplete information.
First, we show that if each player's incremental ex post payo® is uniformly increas-
ing in its own action and type, and its type is su±ciently uninformative of the
types of its opponents (independence), then its expected payo® satis¯es a strict
single crossing property in its own action and type, for any strategy pro¯le played
by its opponents. This ensures that a player's best response to any strategy pro-
¯le is a monotone pure strategy. Secondly, we show that if, in addition, there is
su±cient heterogeneity of the conditional density of types, then the best response
correspondence is a contraction mapping. This ensures equilibrium existence and
uniqueness. In contrast to existing results, our uniqueness result does not rely on
strategic complementarities; this allows for a wider range of applications.
Keywords: Incomplete Information, Heterogeneity, Existence, Unique pure strategy
equilibrium.
JEL classi¯cation: C72; D82.
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This paper studies existence and uniqueness of equilibrium which is in monotone pure
strategies in games of incomplete information. Several papers have established existence of
pure strategy equilibria in incomplete information games under a variety of assumptions.
For example, Milgrom and Weber (1985) show existence in games with a ¯nite number
of actions and (conditionally) independent types. Milgrom and Roberts (1990) and Vives
(1990) work with supermodular games. The pure strategy equilibria in these games
need not be monotone. A few papers have studied existence of monotone pure strategy
equilibria: in particular, Athey (2001) and McAdams (forthcoming) (discussed further
below). Finally, a strand of the literature has established that in a particular class
of supermodular games (called global games), a unique equilibrium exists which is in
monotone pure strategies; see Carlsson and van Damme (1993) and Frankel et al. (2003).
This paper provides a su±cient condition for existence and uniqueness of equilibrium
in monotone pure strategies in a broad class of games of incomplete information. The
class of games we consider includes most supermodular and all global games, for example;
but is broader, since it does not require that players' actions are strategic complements.
Our argument has two steps. First, we show that a player's incremental expected payo®
satis¯es a strict single crossing property in its own action and type, for any strategy
pro¯le of its opponents, if its incremental ex post payo® is uniformly increasing in its
own action and type, and its type is su±ciently uninformative about the types of its
opponents. Since the strict single crossing property holds for any strategy pro¯le adopted
by the opponents, each player's best response is a monotone pure strategy. Secondly,
we show that if, in addition, there is su±cient heterogeneity of the conditional density
of types, then the best response correspondence is a contraction mapping. This ensures
that equilibrium exists and that it is unique.
The argument is easiest to see in an example with independent, private values and
1binary actions. Suppose that a player's payo® di®erence between the two actions is
separable in two terms: the ¯rst is strictly increasing in the type of the player; the
second depends on the actions of other players. Since the players are assumed to be
independent, player i's type tells it nothing about the types of its opponents. Hence
player i's expectation of the payo® di®erence is strictly increasing in its type, irrespective
of its opponents' strategies; therefore in equilibrium, players use monotone pure strategies.
To show that there exists a unique equilibrium in monotone pure strategies, we must show
that there is a unique threshold type who is indi®erent between the two actions. Consider
a threshold player; and consider its estimate of the payo® e®ect of its opponents' actions.
If this estimate is su±ciently insensitive to the threshold player's type, then the threshold
player's expected payo® di®erence is strictly increasing in its type. Hence there can be only
one solution to the indi®erence condition: if there were multiple solutions, the function
would have to be decreasing at (at least) one of the solutions. If the conditional density
of types is su±ciently °at, then threshold player's estimate of its opponents's action will
not vary very much with its type.
These arguments can be extended to more general payo®s and for more general distri-
butions that allow types to be dependent. For more general payo®s, we require that the
incremental ex post payo®s are increasing in own action and type. For more general type
distributions, we require that the likelihood of other players' types is not too sensitive to
the type of an individual player. In the case when the conditional density is di®erentiable,
this condition requires that the Fisher information is bounded above. Finally, a condi-
tional density with a small upper bound ensures that the equilibrium correspondence is
unique.
Athey (2001) establishes existence of monotone pure strategy equilibria. She shows
that a single crossing condition|that each player's expected payo® satis¯es monotone
incremental returns in its own type given any non-decreasing strategy pro¯le played by
2its opponents|ensures existence of equilibrium. She shows further that games in which
ex post payo®s are supermodular in all players' actions and types, and in which types
are a±liated, satisfy the single crossing condition. We also derive a single crossing con-
dition; we show that a condition slightly stronger than supermodularity with respect
own action and type, and uninformative types, ensures this single crossing condition. If
these assumptions are supplemented by heterogeneity, then we can establish that the only
equilibrium that exists is in monotone pure strategies.
The technical details of our argument are quite di®erent from those of Athey (and
extended by McAdams (forthcoming) to the case of multidimensional actions and types).
The key step for both Athey and McAdams is to establish convexity of the best-response
correspondence, in order to apply a ¯xed point theorem. In contrast, we use a contraction
mapping argument. Our approach has a number of advantages. First, it gives both
existence and uniqueness of equilibrium. Secondly, it seems to be a very °exible analytical
approach. For example, we are able to accommodate the extension to multidimensional
actions and types relatively easily; in contrast, as McAdams shows, multidimensional
actions (in particular) present a challenge when establishing convexity of the best response
correspondence. Thirdly, the contraction approach leads to parameteric restrictions that
have a clear economic interpretation. In particular, the information requirements, in
terms of independence and heterogeneity, are intuitive.
Our analysis helps to clarify the mechanism at work in a number of previous papers
that have found, in a variety of situations, that heterogeneity can ensure uniqueness of
equilibrium. For example, in a canonical two-by-two public good model in Fudenberg
and Tirole (1991, pp. 211{213), there are two pure strategy equilibria in the common
knowledge game. If the distribution of types satis¯es certain conditions, there is only
one equilibrium in the incomplete information game. One such condition is that the
maximum value of the density is su±ciently small; following Grandmont (1992), this
3can be interpreted as requiring a su±cient degree of heterogeneity between the players.
Burdzy et al. (2001) demonstrate that there can be a unique equilibrium in a model
in which players face exogenous shocks, can change their action only occasionally, and
are heterogeneous in the frequency with which they can change their action. Herrendorf
et al. (2000) show how heterogeneity in the manufacturing productivity (rather than
the information) of agents in a two-sector, increasing returns-to-scale model can remove
indeterminacy and multiplicity of equilibrium. Glaeser and Scheinkman (2002) show that
if there is not too much heterogeneity among players, then there can be multiple equilibria
in social interaction games. In all of these papers, heterogeneity lays some part in ensuring
the uniqueness of equilibrium. Our analysis shows exactly what form of heterogeneity is
needed, and exactly what mechanism is at work when heterogeneity yields uniqueness.
An important alternative approach to establishing equilibrium uniqueness in incom-
plete information games concerns the class of games known as `global games'. Global
games are games of incomplete information whose type space is determined by the play-
ers each observing a noisy signal of an underlying state; see Carlsson and van Damme
(1993), Morris and Shin (1998), and Morris and Shin (2002). If players' actions are
strict strategic complements, there are `dominance regions' (i.e., types for which there
is a strictly dominant action), and players' signals are su±ciently informative about the
true underlying state, then global games have a unique, dominance solvable equilibrium.
(Existence of equilibrium is assured by the results of Milgrom and Roberts (1990) on
supermodular games.)
An attractive feature of the global game approach is that a very small (informational)
perturbation of a complete information model with multiple equilibria can yield a unique
equilibrium. In contrast, our approach typically requires su±ciently large perturbations
from the complete information case. The major advantage of our approach, relative to
global games, is that we do not require strategic complementarities or dominance regions.
4This allows our results to be used in a wider range of applications.1
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we analyze a simple
model, based on a particular payo® function and the normal distribution, to make the
basic points of the paper. We extend the analysis in section 3 to show how the conclusions
can be generalized to other payo®s and distributions. In the initial version of the model,
we follow the set-up of Athey; in particular, we assume that the action sets are ¯nite
and one-dimensional, and type sets bounded and one-dimensional. In section 3.2, we
show how the analysis can be extended to relax these assumptions. Section 4 concludes.
Longer proofs are in the appendix.
2 A Simple Model
Suppose that there is a continuum of players, of measure 1. There are two possible
actions. The payo® to any player from action 0 is zero. The payo® to player i from
action 1 is ti + g(n). ti is player i's type, which is private information observed only by
player i. It is drawn from a normal distribution with mean y and variance ¾2. Players'
types are correlated|the degree of correlation between the types of player i and j 6= i is
½ 2 [0;1) (note that perfect correlation is ruled out). Hence when player i has a private
type of ti, its posterior of the type t¡i of any other player ¡i is normally distributed
1Global games have been used to analyze currency attacks (see Morris and Shin (1998)) and the
pricing of debt (see Morris and Shin (forthcoming)), to name only two examples. But there are many
applications in which the assumption of strategic complementarity is inappropriate. For example, in
industrial organization, it is reasonable that positive network e®ects might hold in a new market when a
small number of ¯rms have entered; but that the network e®ects become negative once too many ¯rms
enter and the market becomes crowded. In the Internet, each new web site, or the addition of information
to an existing site, increases the value of the Internet to every existing user. However, as usage of the
Internet grows, so does congestion. Goldstein and Pauzner (2002) study a model of bank runs based on
Diamond and Dybvig (1983). In their model, an agent's incentive for early withdrawal of funds from a
bank is non-monotonic in the number of agents withdrawing. The incentive is highest when the number
of agents demanding withdrawal reaches the level at which the bank goes bankrupt; after that point, the
incentive decreases. (Despite this lack of complete strategic complementarity, Goldstein and Pauzner are
able to establish uniqueness of equilibrium.)
5with mean ½ti + (1 ¡ ½)y and variance ¾2(1 ¡ ½2). y;¾2 and ½ are common knowledge.
Finally, n 2 [0;1] is the proportion of players choosing action 1. g : [0;1] ! R is an
interaction function, describing how a player's utility is a®ected by the actions of other
players. We assume that it is continuous and bounded i.e., there exists a ¯nite k such
that supn2[0;1] jg(n)j · k=2.2
Consider any strategy pro¯le played by all players other than i. This pro¯le induces
a distribution s(t) : R ! [0;1] that gives the proportion of players choosing action 1 for
a given value of t. The expected utility gain for player i of choosing action 1, conditional
on being type ti, is then
¢U(ti;s) ´ ti +
1
p
2¼¾
p
1 ¡ ½2
Z +1
¡1
g(s(t))exp
2
4¡
1
2
Ã
t ¡ ½ti ¡ (1 ¡ ½)y
¾
p
1 ¡ ½2
!23
5dt: (1)
So player i's expected utility has two components: the expected stand-alone utility (the
¯rst term of the expression), and the expected interaction utility (the second term).
2.1 The Independent Case
Consider ¯rst the case of independent types: ½ = 0. Clearly in this case, the expected
interaction utility does not depend on player i's type. It is then immediate that ¢U(ti;s)
is a strictly increasing function of ti for any s(¢). This means that the best response to
any distribution s(¢) induced by any strategy pro¯le is a monotone pure strategy.
Proposition 1 In the independent case, ½ = 0, the best response BR(s) to any distribu-
2The assumptions that types are unbounded and the interaction term is bounded means that there
are dominance regions i.e., for su±ciently low (high) values of ti, it is strictly dominant to choose action
0 (1) for any player i. Our argument does not rely on this feature; see section 3.2 for further discussion.
6tion s(¢) induced by any strategy pro¯le is a monotone pure strategy, taking the form
BR(s) =
8
> > <
> > :
0 t < ~ t;
1 t ¸ ~ t
for some ~ t 2 (
¹
t;¹ t).
Hence, any equilibrium must be in monotone pure strategies. Given the threshold
point ~ t in a symmetric monotone pure strategy equilibrium, the expected utility of a
player of type ~ t is
¢U(~ t) ´ ~ t +
1
p
2¼¾
ÃZ ~ t
¡1
g(0)exp
"
¡
1
2
µ
t ¡ y
¾
¶2#
dt
+
Z
1
~ t
g(1)exp
"
¡
1
2
µ
t ¡ y
¾
¶2#
dt
!
: (2)
The equilibrium threshold point satis¯es the equation
¢U(~ t) , 0: (3)
MS show in the case of strict strategic complements (i.e., g(¢) strictly increasing) that a
necessary and su±cient condition for there to be a unique solution to equation (3) is that
¾ is su±ciently large i.e., that there is enough heterogeneity. A similar argument is given
in HVW, who give a su±cient, but not necessary condition based on heterogeneity. The
next proposition shows that the assumption of strategic complementarity is not needed
for this result.
Proposition 2 For any continuous and bounded interaction function g(¢), in the inde-
pendent case, there exists a ¾¤ ¸ 0 such that if ¾ > ¾¤, then there is a unique equilibrium.
7Proof. There is a unique rationalizable action for (almost) all types i® d¢U(~ t)=d~ t > 0
for any ~ t at which ¢U(~ t) = 0. Di®erentiation of equation (2) gives
d¢U(~ t)
d~ t
= 1 +
µ
g(0) ¡ g(1))
p
2¼¾
¶
exp
"
¡
µ~ t ¡ y
¾
¶2#
:
Since jg(0) ¡ g(1)j · k, a su±cient condition for d¢U(~ t)=d~ t > 0 is
1 >
k
p
2¼¾
which completes the proof. ¤
2.2 Positive Correlation
Now suppose that there is a degree of correlation: ½ 2 (0;1). In this section, we derive
joint conditions on heterogeneity ¾, correlation ½, and the interaction function bound k
such that the best response of player i to any strategy pro¯le played by all other players
is a monotone pure strategy. Once this fact is established, su±cient heterogeneity again
ensures uniqueness of equilibrium. Hence the basic mechanism that generates uniqueness
in the case of independence extends to positive, but limited correlation.
Proposition 3 If
s
1 ¡ ½2
½2 >
k
p
2¼¾
; (4)
then the best response to any strategy pro¯le is a monotone pure strategy.
Proof. See Appendix A.
In order to establish uniqueness of equilibrium in the correlated case, we now derive
a condition for there to be a unique monotone pure strategy equilibrium, assuming that
8such an equilibrium exists. This result is stated in proposition 4; as in proposition 2,
it basically requires su±ciently large heterogeneity (for any given values of ½ and k).
We then combine the results of propositions 3 and 4 to give a su±cient condition for
equilibrium uniqueness.
Proposition 4 If
r
1 + ½
1 ¡ ½
>
k
p
2¼¾
; (5)
and a monotone pure strategy equilibrium exists, then there is a unique monotone pure
strategy equilibrium.
Proof. As in the proof of proposition 2, there is a unique threshold for (almost) all types
i® d¢U(~ t)=d~ t > 0 for any ~ t at which ¢U(~ t) = 0, where
¢U(~ t) ´ ~ t +
1
p
2¼¾
p
1 ¡ ½2
0
@
Z ~ t
¡1
g(0)exp
2
4¡
1
2
Ã
t ¡ ½~ t ¡ (1 ¡ ½)y
¾
p
1 ¡ ½2
!23
5dt
+
Z
1
~ t
g(1)exp
2
4¡
1
2
Ã
t ¡ ½~ t ¡ (1 ¡ ½)y
¾
p
1 ¡ ½2
!23
5dt
1
A:
Di®erentiation shows that a su±cient condition for d¢U(~ t)=d~ t > 0 is
1 >
k
p
2¼¾
Ã
1 ¡ ½
p
1 ¡ ½2
!
:
This completes the proof. ¤
Proposition 5 If
1 > min
"s
1 ¡ ½2
½2 ;
r
1 + ½
1 ¡ ½
#
>
k
p
2¼¾
(6)
then there is a unique equilibrium which is in monotone pure strategies.
9Proof. To have a unique equilibrium in monotone pure strategies, equations (4) and (5)
must both hold. Also observe that
s
1 ¡ ½2
½2 ¸
r
1 + ½
1 ¡ ½
for ½ 2 [0; 1
2]
s
1 ¡ ½2
½2 ·
r
1 + ½
1 ¡ ½
for ½ 2 [1
2;1):
So condition (5) implies (4) for ½ 2 (0; 1
2] while the converse holds for ½ 2 [1
2;1). The
result follows. ¤
Proposition 5 gives a joint condition on the model parameters ½;¾ and k that is
su±cient for equilibrium uniqueness. The proposition is illustrated in ¯gure 1, which
gives an intuitive interpretation of the result.
0
0 ½ 1
¾
Unique eqm
k p
2¼
q
1¡½
1+½
k p
2¼
q
½2
1¡½2
Figure 1: Proposition 5
10Two facts stand out from the ¯gure. First, the ¯gure demonstrates the statements
made in the introduction of the paper|that there is a unique equilibrium (in monotone
pure strategies) if and only if there is su±cient heterogeneity of types. In ¯gure 1, the
su±cient condition requires the correlation between players' types to be su±ciently low
and/or the variance of the prior distribution su±ciently high. (For certain parameter
values, there is also a lower bound on the value of ½.)
Secondly, our su±cient condition for uniqueness of equilibrium is stricter than that of
MS. In the ¯gure, the MS result gives a unique equilibrium for all parameter values lying
in the area under the downward-sloping curve. We require in addition that parameter
values lie in the area beneath the upward-sloping line. But, in contrast to MS, we do
not require that players' actions are strategic complements|proposition 5 holds for any
bounded interactions between the players. So, while our su±cient condition is indeed
stricter than MS's when actions are strategic complements, it is less strict in the sense
that it applies to a larger class of games.
These observations highlight the mechanism at work here: the conditions ensure that
a monotone pure strategy is a best response to all other strategies; and that there is a
unique monotone pure strategy equilibrium.
3 The General Model
The simple model establishes the role that independence, and hence small correlation,
plays in ensuring equilibrium uniqueness. There is a possibility, however, that the con-
clusions depend on the simplifying assumptions of the model. In this section, we extend
the model in a few directions to show that this is not the case. In particular, we allow
for a more general payo® structure and distribution of types.
113.1 Finite and Single-Dimensional Action Games
Consider a game of incomplete information between I players, i 2 I ´ f1;:::;Ig, where
each player ¯rst observes its own type, ti 2 Ti ´ [
¹
ti;¹ ti] ½ R and then takes an action ai
from an action set Ai that is a closed, ¯nite subset of the unit interval that contains 0 and
1 i.e., f0;1g µ Ai ½ [0;1]. (The restriction to the unit interval is simply a normalization.)
Let a denote an action pro¯le: a = (a1;:::;aI); and let A ´ £Ai the space of action
pro¯les. A type pro¯le and the space of type pro¯les are similarly de¯ned as t and
T ´ £Ti. Finally, let a¡i denote the pro¯le of actions of all other players, and A¡i the
space of all such action pro¯les. A similar notation is adopted for type pro¯les, strategy
pro¯les, marginals etc..
Player i's payo® function is ui : A £ T ! R. We assume that
U1. Bounded Payo®s. The payo® function ui : A£T ! R is bounded and measurable.
Let
¢ui(ai;a
0
i;a¡i;t) ´ ui(ai;a¡i;t) ¡ ui(a
0
i;a¡i;t):
The joint distribution of players' types is given by the probability measure ´ on the
(Borel) subsets of T. The marginal distribution on each Ti is denoted ´i. We make the
following assumption:
D1. Conditional Densities. The types have conditional densities with respect to the
Lebesgue measure. The conditional density of t¡i given ti, is denoted f(t¡ijti) for
i 2 I and is strictly positive.
Players use behavioural strategies. A behavioural strategy for player i is a measurable
function ¹i : Ai £ Ti ! [0;1] where Ai is the collection of Borel subsets of Ai, with
the following properties: (i) for every B 2 Ai, the function ¹i(B;¢) : Ti ! [0;1] is
12measurable; (ii) for every ti 2 Ti, the function ¹i(¢;ti) : Ai ! [0;1] is a probability
measure. Hence when player i observes its type ti, it selects an action in Ai according to
the measure ¹i(¢;ti). A pure strategy in behavioural form is simply a function that returns
a probability measure that is concentrated on the graph of a classical pure strategy.3
Let ¹¡i denote the vector of behavioural strategies played by the opponents of player
i. Assumption 1 allows the interim expected payo® of player i (i.e., when it knows its
type ti and has chosen its action ai) to be written as:
Ui(ai;ti;¹¡i) =
Z
T¡i
Z
A¡i
ui(a;t)
Y
j6=i
d¹j(¢;tj)f(t¡ijti)dt¡i:
We make a further assumption on payo® functions:
U2. Uniformly Positive Sensitivity to Own Action and Type. There is a ± 2
(0;1) such that for all ai ¸ a0
i, ti ¸ t0
i, a¡i;t¡i and i 2 I,
¢ui(ai;a
0
i;a¡i;ti;t¡i) ¡ ¢ui(ai;a
0
i;a¡i;t
0
i;t¡i) ¸ ±(ai ¡ a
0
i)(ti ¡ t
0
i):
Assumption U2 essentially requires that a higher type makes a higher action more appeal-
ing to a player. It is similar to, but stronger than, an assumption that a player's payo®
function ui(ai;a¡i;t) is supermodular in (ai;ti).4 In our case, supermodularity of ui in
(ai;ti) implies that ¢ui(ai;a0
i;a¡i;ti;t¡i) ¸ ¢ui(ai;a0
i;a¡i;t0
i;t¡i); clearly, therefore, the
3An alternative approach would use distributional strategies. A distributional strategy for player i is a
probability measure ¹i on Ai£Ti such that the marginal distribution on Ti is ´i i.e., ¹i(Ai£S) = ´i(S) for
any Borel subset S of Ti; see Milgrom and Weber (1985). As Milgrom and Weber show, there is a many-
to-one mapping from behavioural strategies to distributional strategies. In fact, there is little di®erence
between the two approaches here, since we establish quickly (see theorem 1) that in equilibrium, only
monotone pure strategies are used. It is slightly more convenient, however, to use behavioural strategies.
4Let X be a lattice i.e., a partially ordered set that includes both the meet ^ (the greatest lower
bound) and join _ (the least upper bound) of any two elements in the set. A function h : X ! R
is supermodular if, for all x;y 2 X, h(x _ y) + h(x ^ y) ¸ h(x) + h(y). In the case that h is twice
13uniform boundedness assumption is stronger. Nevertheless, the assumption is satis¯ed
in a large number of games, including most supermodular games (see Athey (2001) for a
longer discussion of this class of games); we note in passing that global games belong to
this class.
In addition, assumption U1 and the ¯niteness of action sets assumed in this section
imply Lipschitz conditions, expressed in the following corollary (which is stated without
proof, as the statements are immediate).
Corollary 1 Assumption U1 and ¯nite action sets imply that
U3. Uniformly Bounded Sensitivity to Own Action. For each a¡i and t, there is
an ! 2 (0;1) such that for all ai ¸ a0
i and i 2 I,
¢ui(ai;a
0
i;a¡i;t) · !(ai ¡ a
0
i):
U4. Uniformly Bounded Sensitivity to Opponents' Action. There is a · 2 (0;1)
such that for all ai ¸ a0
i;t and i 2 I,
¢ui(ai;a
0
i;a¡i;t) ¡ ¢ui(ai;a
0
i;a
0
¡i;t) · ·(ai ¡ a
0
i)ka¡i ¡ a
0
¡ik
where ka¡i ¡ a0
¡ik ´ maxj6=i jaj ¡ a0
jj.
In this section, conditions U3 and U4 are consequences of previous assumptions. In section
3.2 when we consider games with a continuum of actions, an additional (continuity)
assumption must be made.
di®erentiable, h is supermodular if and only if
@2
@xi@xj
h(x) ¸ 0
for all i;j; see Topkis (1998).
14We make the following assumptions about the conditional density:
D2. There is a ¶ 2 (0;1) such that for any ti > t0
i and i 2 I,
p
I(ti;t0
i) · ¶(ti ¡ t0
i),
where
I(ti;t
0
i) ´ VarT¡i
µ
f(t¡ijti) ¡ f(t¡ijt0
i)
f(t¡ijti)
¶
:
D3. There is a º 2 [0;1) such that fj(tjjti) · º for all i;j 2 I and j 6= i where
fj(tjjti) =
Z
£
k6=i;j
Tk
f(t¡ijti)dt¡i:
The function de¯ned in assumption D2 is the expectation of the square of a likelihood
ratio:
ET¡i
"µ
f(t¡ijt0
i)
f(t¡ijti)
¶2#
;
and so is a measure of di®erential information. In the case that the conditional density
f(t¡ijti) is di®erentiable in ti, the function is related to the Fisher information of a
player's type about the types of the opponents. To see this, consider the limit as t0
i ! ti:
lim
ti!t0
i
I(ti;t0
i)
ti ¡ t0
i
! I(ti) ´ VarT¡i
µ
@ lnf(t¡ijti)
@ti
¶
:
I(ti) is the variance of a score function and so is the Fisher information, measuring how
sensitive the likelihood of other players' types is to the type of player i. Hence assumption
D2 bounds the Fisher information in the model.
Assumption D3 introduces a particular type of heterogeneity, in terms of the upper
bound º on the conditional density. This condition is similar to the one used by Grand-
mont (1992): we, like him, require the density function to be su±ciently °at.
In the next lemma (the proof of which is in the appendix), we derive a su±cient
15condition that ensures that a player's interim expected payo® function satis¯es the strict
single crossing condition. We then use this property in theorem 1 to argue that all players
use monotone pure strategies.
Lemma 1 Given assumptions U1{U3 and D1{D2, if ¶ < ±=!, then player i's (interim)
expected payo® satis¯es the strict single crossing property in (ai;ti) for any ¹¡i i.e.,
Ui(ai;t0
i;¹¡i) ¸ Ui(a0
i;t0
i;¹¡i) implies Ui(ai;ti;¹¡i) > Ui(a0
i;ti;¹¡i) for all ai > a0
i and
ti > t0
i.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Theorem 1 Given assumptions U1{U3 and D1{D2, if ¶ < ±=!, then the best response
of player i to any pro¯le of opponents' strategies is a monotone pure strategy.
Proof. The action set Ai is totally ordered (because f0;1g µ Ai ½ [0;1]), implying
that Ui(ai;ti;¹¡i) is quasisupermodular in ai. Moreover, Ai is independent of ti, and
Ti 2 R is also totally ordered. Finally, Ui(ai;ti;¹¡i) satis¯es the strict single crossing
property when ¶ < ±=!, from lemma 1. Therefore by the Monotone Selection Theorem 40
of Milgrom and Shannon (1990),
s
¤
i(ti;¹¡i) = arg max
ai2Ai
Ui(ai;ti;¹¡i)
is monotone non-decreasing in ti. (The strict single crossing property implies that there
is indi®erence only on sets of measure zero.) ¤
The su±cient condition in theorem 1 ensuring that each agent plays a monotone pure
strategy is stronger than that found in the simple model of section 2 (see proposition 2).
The Fisher information with the normal distribution is
I(ti) =
½2
¾2(1 ¡ ½2)
;
16in contrast, the su±cient condition in proposition 4 for the normal distribution bounds
½2
2¼¾2(1 ¡ ½2)
:
The factor of 2¼ that does not appear in the bound in this section means that the
su±cient condition in theorem 1 is more demanding. Nevertheless, it is doing much the
same work as the condition in proposition 4. Both require that a player's type tells it
su±ciently little about the types of other players|in the case of proposition 4, by ensuring
that heterogeneity is su±ciently large and/or correlation su±ciently small; in the case of
theorem 1, by bounding the Fisher information.
The assumptions required for theorem 1|in particular, assumptions U2 and D2|can
be contrasted to the conditions used by Athey (2001). In both papers, the ¯rst step is to
establish that an expected payo® satisfy a single crossing property in incremental returns
(SCP-IR).5 Athey imposes such an assumption from the outset, when all other players
use non-decreasing strategies; she shows that the assumption is satis¯ed in games where
agents' ex post utility is supermodular in a and (ai;tj); j 2 I and types are a±liated
(see Athey (2001, theorem 3)). In contrast, we assume that the ex post utility function
ui satis¯es a condition slightly stronger than supermodularity in own action and type,
(ai;ti), and that types are not too associated. We can then show that the expected payo®
satis¯es a SCP-IR for any strategy pro¯les of opponents.
The second step is to show that there is a unique equilibrium in monotone pure
strategies. A su±cient condition for this is given in the next theorem.
Theorem 2 Given assumptions U1{U4 and D1{D3 hold, if
¶ +
·º
¸!
·
±
!
(7)
5A function h : R2 ! R satis¯es single crossing of incremental returns in (x;µ) if, for all xH > xL
and µH > µL, h(xH;µL) ¡ h(xL;µL) ¸ (>)0 implies h(xH;µH) ¡ h(xL;µH) ¸ (>)0. See Milgrom and
Shannon (1990).
17where ¸ < 1, then there is a unique equilibrium, which is in monotone pure strategies.
Proof. See Appendix C.
Note that compared to theorem 1, which requires only that ¶ is less than ±=!, the
su±cient condition in theorem 2 is stricter.
What is condition (7) ensuring? It does the two things that were illustrated in the
simple model in section 2. First, it ensures that a player's own type dominates interaction
e®ects in payo® terms enough to make any best response a non-decreasing pure strategy.
Roughly speaking, if condition (7) is satis¯ed, then each player places more weight on
its own type than on the possible actions of its opponents when choosing its best ac-
tion. Secondly, the condition ensures that there is a unique equilibrium in monotone pure
strategies. It does so by using in the general case the mechanism that was used in the
binary action case. In order for there to be multiple equilibria in non-decreasing strate-
gies, it must be that there are multiple values of a player's type that leaves that player
indi®erent between the two actions. The direct e®ect of a player's type is monotonic: the
utility di®erence between the actions increases with type, other things equal. So, in order
for there to be multiple equilibria, the indirect e®ect, operating through the player's as-
sessment of its opponents' actions, must dominate. Condition (7) ensures that the direct,
own-type e®ect is su±ciently strong; or that the interaction e®ect is su±ciently weak;
or that the player's type is su±ciently uninformative about the types (and hence likely
action) of others. It therefore ensures that the direct e®ect dominates and multiplicity is
not possible.
It is worth comparing condition (7) with condition (5) established in proposition 4.
Recall that there, a contraction mapping was found for monotone pure strategies when
±
·
>
1
¾
p
2¼
r
1 ¡ ½
1 + ½
18in the private value case. (In fact, ± = 1 in the simple model; it is written here as a
general parameter for comparability.) Condition (7) requires that
±
·
¸
1
¾
½
p
1 ¡ ½2 +
2
¸¾
p
2¼
p
1 ¡ ½2
where the expressions for the Fisher information and the maximum value of the density
of the normal have been used. Condition (7) therefore implies condition (5) if
1
¾
½
p
1 ¡ ½2 +
2
¸¾
p
2¼
p
1 ¡ ½2 >
1
¾
p
2¼
µr
1 ¡ ½
1 + ½
¶
i.e., ½(1+
p
2¼) > 1¡2=¸, which certainly holds since ¸ < 1. In summary: the su±cient
condition in theorem 2 is stricter than the su±cient condition in proposition 4.
Finally, we note that Athey (2001, p. 879) commented that \[t]here is not a global
\contraction mapping" theorem". We agree with this observation: assumptions U2{
U4 and D2{D3 are restrictive, but needed if a contraction is to be established. As we
mentioned in the introduction, we make stronger assumptions than Athey and so obtain
stronger results.
3.2 Extensions
In this section, we consider how the su±cient condition for equilibrium uniqueness estab-
lished in theorem 2 stands up to various extensions of the model.
Consider ¯rst the extension to a continuum of actions for each player, so that Ai =
[0;1]; i 2 I. The argument of Athey (2001, theorem 2) can be used in a direct way to
establish the uniqueness of equilibrium in this case. One extra assumption is required:
U5. Payo® Continuity. Each ui(a;t) is continuous in a.
Note that in this case, the Lipschitz conditions U3 and U4 are implied by assumptions
19U1 and U5. With this assumption, the conditions in theorem 2 ensure that there is a
unique equilibrium in monotone pure strategies.
We have assumed that the type sets Ti are bounded: Ti ´ [
¹
ti;¹ ti] ½ R. If this as-
sumption does not hold, then the metric used to establish the contraction (see the proof
of theorem 2 in the appendix) is not well-de¯ned. In this case, we need an additional
assumption:
U6. Limit Dominance. There exist
¹
ti;¹ ti 2 Ti such that
(a) ¢ui(0;a0
i;a¡i;ti;t¡i) > 0 for all a0
i 6= 0, a¡i 2 A¡i, t¡i 2 T¡i, and ti ·
¹
ti,
(b) ¢ui(1;a0
i;a¡i;ti;t¡i) > 0 for all a0
i 6= 1, a¡i 2 A¡i, t¡i 2 T¡i, and ti ¸ ¹ ti.
With this assumption, the previous arguments again apply.
Suppose now that the type and action sets are multi-dimensional (c.f., McAdams
(forthcoming)). Let the common support of types be T = [
¹
t;¹ t]h ½ Rh for some ¯nite
h; and the common action set A of all players be a ¯nite sublattice of k-dimensional
Euclidean space with respect to the product order on Rk, where we normalize so that
f0;1gk µ Ai ½ [0;1]k. A typical action for player i is ai ´ (a1
i;:::;ak
i); a typical action
pro¯le is a ´ (a1;:::;aI).
Some of the previous assumptions have to be restated in straightforward ways:
U2'. Uniformly Positive Sensitivity to Own Type. There is a ± 2 (0;1) such that
for all ai ¸ a0
i, ti ¸ t0
i, a¡i;t¡i and i 2 I,
¢ui(ai;a
0
i;a¡i;ti;t¡i) ¡ ¢ui(ai;a
0
i;a¡i;t
0
i;t¡i) ¸ ± max
l
(a
l
i ¡ a
0l
i )max
p (t
p
i ¡ t
0p
i ):
U3'. Uniformly Bounded Sensitivity to Own Action. For each a¡i and t, there is
20an ! 2 (0;1) such that for all ai ¸ a0
i and i 2 I,
¢ui(ai;a
0
i;a¡i;t) · ! max
l
(a
l
i ¡ a
0l
i ):
U4'. Uniformly Bounded Sensitivity to Opponents' Action. There is a · 2 (0;1)
such that for all ai;a0
i;t and i 2 I,
¢ui(ai;a
0
i;a¡i;t) ¡ ¢ui(ai;a
0
i;a
0
¡i;t) · ·max
l
(a
l
i ¡ a
0l
i )ka¡i ¡ a
0
¡ik
where ka¡i ¡ a0
¡ik ´ maxj6=i maxl jal
j ¡ a0l
jj.
D2'. There is a ¶ 2 (0;1) such that for any ti > t0
i and i 2 I,
p
I(ti;t0
i) · ¶maxp(t
p
i ¡t
0p
i ),
where
I(ti;t
0
i) ´ VarT¡i
µ
f(t¡ijti) ¡ f(t¡ijt0
i)
f(t¡ijti)
¶
:
We make the additional assumption:
U7. Quasi-supermodularity. ui(ai;a¡i;t) is quasi-supermodular in ai 2 Ai for all
a¡i 2 A¡i, t 2 T and i 2 I.6
Quasi-supermodularity expresses a weak kind of complementarity between the choice
variables.
We are then able to extend theorems 1 and 2 to the multi-dimensional case. In
the one-dimensional case, the appropriate notion was a monotone pure strategy. In the
multi-dimensional case, this generalizes to an isotone pure strategy: in an isotone pure
6A function h : X ! R on a lattice X is quasi-supermodular if (i) h(x) ¸ h(x^y) implies h(x_y) ¸
h(y) and (ii) h(x) > h(x _ y) > h(y).
21strategy, ti > t0
i implies ai(ti) ¸ ai(t0
i) i.e., the action chosen by a type that is higher in
all dimensions is no lower, in all dimensions.
Theorem 3 Given assumptions U1, U2'{U3', U7, D1 and D2', if ¶ < ±=!, then the best
response of player i to any pro¯le of opponents' strategies is a isotone pure strategy.
Theorem 4 Given assumptions U1, U2'{U4', U7, D1, D2' and D3, if
¶ +
·º
¸!
·
±
!
(8)
where ¸ < 1, then there is a unique equilibrium, which is in isotone pure strategies.
Both theorems are proved by noting that previous proofs are amended in a straightforward
way to accommodate multi-dimensional types and actions; and by noting that, with the
addition of assumption U7, all the conditions for the proof of theorem 1 are satis¯ed.
4 Conclusions
In this paper, we have provided a su±cient condition for there to be a unique equilibrium,
which is in monotone pure strategies, in games of incomplete information. The condition
relates payo® parameters to informational conditions (independence and heterogeneity)
in a way that ensures that the equilibrium mapping is a contraction. Using the contrac-
tion approach allows us to accommodate a number of extensions relatively easily. This
°exibility should prove useful in applications.
22Appendix
A Proof of Proposition 3
A su±cient condition for player i's best response to any distribution s(¢) induced by any
strategy pro¯le to be a monotone pure strategy is that the expected utility ¢U(ti;s) (see
equation (1)) is a strictly increasing function of ti. This requires that
1 >
1
p
2¼¾
p
1 ¡ ½2
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
@
@ti
0
@
Z +1
¡1
f(s(t))exp
2
4¡
1
2
Ã
t ¡ ½ti ¡ (1 ¡ ½)y
¾
p
1 ¡ ½2
!23
5dt
1
A
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
=
½
p
2¼¾2(1 ¡ ½2)
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
Z +1
¡1
f(s(t))
Ã
t ¡ ½ti ¡ (1 ¡ ½)y
¾
p
1 ¡ ½2
!
exp
2
4¡
1
2
Ã
t ¡ ½ti ¡ (1 ¡ ½)y
¾
p
1 ¡ ½2
!23
5dt
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
:
Since the normal distribution is symmetric around the mean,
1
p
2¼¾
p
1 ¡ ½2
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
Z +1
¡1
f(s(t))
Ã
t ¡ ½ti ¡ (1 ¡ ½)y
¾
p
1 ¡ ½2
!
exp
2
4¡
1
2
Ã
t ¡ ½ti ¡ (1 ¡ ½)y
¾
p
1 ¡ ½2
!23
5dt
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
·
·
p
2¼¾
p
1 ¡ ½2
Z +1
½ti+(1¡½)y
Ã
t ¡ ½ti ¡ (1 ¡ ½)y
¾
p
1 ¡ ½2
!
exp
2
4¡
1
2
Ã
t ¡ ½ti ¡ (1 ¡ ½)y
¾
p
1 ¡ ½2
!23
5dx:
A change of variables
z ´
1
2
Ã
t ¡ ½ti ¡ (1 ¡ ½)y
¾
p
1 ¡ ½2
!2
dt ´
Ã
¾2p
1 ¡ ½2
t ¡ ½ti ¡ (1 ¡ ½)y
!
dz
shows that
1
p
2¼¾
p
1 ¡ ½2
Z +1
½ti+(1¡½)y
Ã
t ¡ ½ti ¡ (1 ¡ ½)y
¾
p
1 ¡ ½2
!
exp
2
4¡
1
2
Ã
t ¡ ½ti ¡ (1 ¡ ½)y
¾
p
1 ¡ ½2
!23
5dt
=
½
p
2¼¾
p
1 ¡ ½2:
23Hence the su±cient condition is
1 >
·½
p
2¼¾
p
1 ¡ ½2
which proves the claim.
B Proof of Lemma 1
Let
¢Ui(ai;a
0
i;ti;¹¡i) ´ Ui(ai;ti;¹¡i) ¡ Ui(a
0
i;ti;¹¡i):
For the strict single crossing property to hold, it is su±cient to show that if ¶ < ±=!, then
¢Ui(ai;a
0
i;ti;¹¡i) > ¢Ui(ai;a
0
i;t
0
i;¹¡i)
for any ai > a0
i and ti > t0
i.
¢Ui(ai;a
0
i;ti;¹¡i) ¡ ¢Ui(ai;a
0
i;t
0
i;¹¡i)
=
Z
T¡i
Z
A¡i
¢ui(ai;a
0
i;a¡i;ti;t¡i)
Y
j6=i
d¹j(¢;tj)f(t¡ijti)dt¡i
¡
Z
T¡i
Z
A¡i
¢ui(ai;a
0
i;a¡i;t
0
i;t¡i)
Y
j6=i
d¹j(¢;tj)f(t¡ijt
0
i)dt¡i
=
Z
T¡i
Z
A¡i
[¢ui(ai;a
0
i;a¡i;ti;t¡i) ¡ ¢ui(ai;a
0
i;a¡i;t
0
i;t¡i)]
Y
j6=i
d¹j(¢;tj)f(t¡ijti)dt¡i
¡
Z
T¡i
Z
A¡i
¢ui(ai;a
0
i;a¡i;t
0
i;t¡i)
Y
j6=i
d¹j(¢;tj)[f(t¡ijt
0
i) ¡ f(t¡ijti)]dt¡i: (B.9)
24From assumption U2, we obtain for the ¯rst term that
Z
T¡i
Z
A¡i
[¢ui(ai;a
0
i;a¡i;ti;t¡i) ¡ ¢ui(ai;a
0
i;a¡i;t
0
i;t¡i)]
Y
j6=i
d¹j(¢;tj)f(t¡ijti)dt¡i
¸ ±(ai ¡ a
0
i)(ti ¡ t
0
i): (B.10)
Now consider the second term in equation (B.9). The integral can be separated, so
that
Z
T¡i
Z
A¡i
¢ui(ai;a
0
i;a¡i;t
0
i;t¡i)
Y
j6=i
d¹j(¢;tj)[f(t¡ijt
0
i) ¡ f(t¡ijti)]dt¡i
=
Z
T¡i
"Z
A¡i
¢ui(ai;a
0
i;a¡i;t
0
i;t¡i)
Y
j6=i
d¹j(¢;tj)
#
f(t¡ijt0
i) ¡ f(t¡ijti)
f(t¡ijti)
f(t¡ijti)dt¡i
·
0
@
Z
T¡i
"Z
A¡i
¢ui(ai;a
0
i;a¡i;t
0
i;t¡i)
Y
j6=i
d¹j(¢;tj)
#2
f(t¡ijti)dt¡i
1
A
1=2
£
ÃZ
T¡i
µ
f(t¡ijt0
i) ¡ f(t¡ijti)
f(t¡ijti)
¶2
f(t¡ijti)dt¡i
!1=2
(B.11)
where in the last line, we use the Cauchy-Schwartz inequality.
Using assumption U3 and the fact ai > a0
i yields an upper bound on the ¯rst term of
the product in equation (B.11),
0
@
Z
T¡i
"Z
A¡i
¢ui(ai;a
0
i;a¡i;t
0
i;t¡i)
Y
j6=i
d¹j(¢;tj)
#2
f(t¡ijti)dt¡i
1
A
1=2
· !(ai ¡ a
0
i): (B.12)
For the second term of the product in equation (B.11),
ÃZ
T¡i
µ
f(t¡ijt0
i) ¡ f(t¡ijti)
f(t¡ijti)
¶2
f(t¡ijti)dt¡i
!1=2
=
s
VarT¡i
µ
f(t¡ijt0
i) ¡ f(t¡ijti)
f(t¡ijti)
¶
25because
ET¡i
·
f(t¡ijt0
i) ¡ f(t¡ijti)
f(t¡ijti)
¸
=
Z
T¡i
f(t¡ijt0
i) ¡ f(t¡ijti)
f(t¡ijti)
f(t¡ijti)dt¡i
=
Z
T¡i
(f(t¡ijt
0
i) ¡ f(t¡ijti))dt¡i = 0
since
R
T¡i f(t¡ijti)dt¡i =
R
T¡i f(t¡ijt0
i)dt¡i = 1. Therefore from assumption D2,
ÃZ
T¡i
µ
f(t¡ijt0
i) ¡ f(t¡ijti)
f(t¡ijti)
¶2
f(t¡ijti)dt¡i
!1=2
· ¶(ti ¡ t
0
i) (B.13)
Combining equation (B.9) with equations (B.10){(B.13) yields
¢Ui(ai;a
0
i;ti;¹¡i) ¡ ¢Ui(ai;a
0
i;t
0
i;¹¡i) ¸ (± ¡ !¶)(ai ¡ a
0
i)(ti ¡ t
0
i) > 0 (B.14)
which proves the lemma.
C Proof of Theorem 2
To show existence and uniqueness of equilibrium we ¯rst construct the best response
correspondence, and then show that under the assumed parameter restrictions the equi-
librium correspondence is a contraction. Then the result follows from the contraction
mapping theorem.
We start by constructing the equilibrium correspondence. Let
a
+
i = minfa 2 Aija > aig
a
¡
i = maxfa 2 Aija < aig;
i.e., a
+
i and a
¡
i are the two actions adjacent to ai. Since the action set is countable, both
26a
+
i and a
¡
i are well de¯ned. For any given vector of opponents' behavioural strategies,
¹¡i, de¯ne ¿i(ai;¹¡i) by
¢Ui(ai;a
¡
i ;¿i(ai;¹¡i);¹¡i) , 0 (C.15)
i.e., ¿i(ai;¹¡i) is the type at which player i is indi®erent between actions ai and a
¡
i .
From lemma 1, if ±=! > ¶, then the function ¢Ui is strictly increasing in ti and so
¿i(ai;¹¡i) is uniquely de¯ned by equation (C.15). Furthermore, ¿i(ai;¹¡i) > ¿i(a
¡
i ;¹¡i).
We maintain the assumption that ±=! > ¶ and show that the assumption is consistent
with the su±cient condition derived in this proof.
De¯ne
Âi(ti;ai;¹¡i) =
8
> > <
> > :
0 ti 62 [¿i(ai;¹¡i);¿i(a
+
i ;¹¡i)];
1 ti 2 [¿i(ai;¹¡i);¿i(a
+
i ;¹¡i)]
for ai 2 Ai and ti 2 Ti. Recall that the best response of player i to any vector of
opponents' strategies ¹¡i is a monotonic pure strategy. Therefore player i's best response
¹i(ai;ti;¹¡i) is an indicator function, so that ¹i(ai;ti;¹¡i) = Âi(ti;ai;¹¡i) for all ai 2 Ai.
An equilibrium is then de¯ned by
¹ = (Âi(ti;ai;¹¡i))i2I ´ Á(¹)(a;t):
Let X denote the set of indicator functions: X :
Q
i2I(Ai £ Ti) ! f0;1gI. The mapping
Á(¹) maps X into itself. So Á(¹) is the equilibrium correspondence.
Now we show that Á(¹) is a contraction. First we demonstrate that space X is
complete under an appropriate metric. Consider any two vectors of behavioural strategies,
27¹ and ¹0. Let d(¹;¹0) denote the metric
d(¹;¹
0) ´ max
i2I
max
ai2Ai
Z
Ti
j¹i(ai;ti) ¡ ¹
0
i(ai;ti)jdti: (C.16)
Notice that the assumption that the type spaces of all players are bounded means that
the distances de¯ned by the metric exist and are ¯nite. Moreover, the metric is a variant
of the L1 metric, and so it is easy to show that it is indeed a metric. The space (X;d)
is complete, since an indicator function is a function of bounded variation (i.e., can be
expressed as the di®erence between monotonic functions), and so, by Helly's selection
theorem (see Kolmogorov and Fomin (1970, p. 372)), has a convergent (sub)sequence.
So for existence and uniqueness of equilibrium, it is su±cient to show that Á(¹) is
a contraction under the metric d i.e., that there is a ¸ < 1 such that d(Á(¹);Á(¹0)) ·
¸d(¹;¹0). Consider
d(Á(¹);Á(¹
0)) = max
i2I
max
a2Ai
Z
Ti
¯ ¯Âi(ai;ti;¹¡i) ¡ Âi(ai;ti;¹
0
¡i)
¯ ¯dti
= max
i2I
max
a2Ai
¡
j¿i(ai;¹¡i) ¡ ¿i(a
+
i ;¹
0
¡i)j ¡ j¿i(a
+
i ;¹¡i) ¡ ¿i(ai;¹
0
¡i)j
¢
· max
i2I
max
a2Ai
¡
j¿i(ai;¹¡i) ¡ ¿i(ai;¹
0
¡i)j ¡ j¿i(a
+
i ;¹¡i) ¡ ¿i(a
+
i ;¹
0
¡i)j
¢
· max
i2I
max
a2Ai
j¿i(ai;¹¡i) ¡ ¿i(ai;¹
0
¡i)j
where in the second line, we use the fact that Âi is an indicator function. A su±cient
condition for Á(¹) to be a contraction under the metric de¯ned in equation (C.16) is
therefore that there is a ¸ 2 (0;1) such that
max
i2I
max
a2Ai
j¿i(ai;¹¡i) ¡ ¿i(ai;¹
0
¡i)j · ¸d(¹;¹
0) (C.17)
First note that ¢Ui(ai;a
¡
i ;¿i(ai;¹¡i);¹¡i) = ¢Ui(ai;a
¡
i ;¿i(ai;¹0
¡i);¹0
¡i) = 0. This
28implies that
j¢Ui(ai;a
¡
i ;¿i(ai;¹¡i);¹¡i) ¡ ¢Ui(ai;a
¡
i ;¿i(ai;¹
0
¡i);¹¡i)j
= j¢Ui(ai;a
¡
i ;¿i(ai;¹
0
¡i);¹
0
¡i) ¡ ¢Ui(ai;a
¡
i ;¿i(ai;¹
0
¡i);¹¡i)j:
(C.18)
Our aim is to bound the left-hand side from below with a bound proportional to j¿i(ai;¹¡i)¡
¿i(ai;¹0
¡i)j; and the right-hand side from above with a bound proportional to d(¹;¹0).
To bound the left-hand side from below, observe that lemma 1, assumption U2 and
that the fact ai > a
¡
i together imply that
¯ ¯ ¯¢Ui(ai;a
¡
i ;¿i(ai;¹¡i);¹¡i)¡¢Ui(ai;a
¡
i ;¿i(ai;¹
0
¡i);¹¡i)
¯ ¯ ¯
¸ (± ¡ ¶!)(ai ¡ a
¡
i )
¯ ¯ ¯¿i(ai;¹¡i) ¡ ¿i(ai;¹
0
¡i)
¯ ¯ ¯:
(C.19)
To bound the right-hand side from above, observe that the de¯nition of ¢Ui implies
¯ ¯ ¯¢Ui(ai;a
¡
i ;¿i(ai;¹
0
¡i);¹
0
¡i) ¡ ¢Ui(ai;a
¡
i ;¿i(ai;¹
0
¡i);¹¡i)
¯ ¯ ¯
·
Z
T¡i
Z
A¡i
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
¢ui(ai;a
¡
i ;a¡i;¿i(ai;¹¡i);t¡i)
"
Y
j6=i
d¹j(¢;tj) ¡
Y
j6=i
d¹
0
j(¢;tj)
#¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
f(t¡ij¿i(ai;¹
0
¡i))dt¡i:
Recall that under the maintained assumption ±=! > ¶, players use pure strategies. So
for any particular tj, ¹j(aj;tj) is an indicator function i.e., for the behavioural strategy
¹j(¢;tj), there exists almost surely a unique a 2 Aj such that ¹j(aj;tj) = 1 for aj = a
and ¹j(a;tj) = 0 for all aj 2 Aj with aj 6= a. Therefore
Z
A¡i
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
¢ui(ai;a
¡
i ;a¡i;¿i(ai;¹¡i);t¡i)
"
Y
j6=i
d¹j(¢;tj) ¡
Y
j6=i
d¹
0
j(¢;tj)
#¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
=
¯ ¯ ¯¢ui(ai;a
¡
i ;a
¹
¡i;¿i(ai;¹¡i);t¡i) ¡ ¢ui(ai;a
¡
i ;a
¹0
¡i;¿i(ai;¹¡i);t¡i)
¯ ¯ ¯:
(C.20)
where a
¹
¡i and a
¹0
¡i are the action pro¯les prescribed by the two strategy pro¯les ¹¡i and
29¹0
¡i.
Next observe that if a
¹
¡i = a
¹0
¡i, then maxj6=i maxaj2Aj j¹j(aj;tj) ¡ ¹0
j(aj;tj)j = 0, and
the right hand side of equation (C.20) is also zero. Alternatively, if a
¹
¡i 6= a
¹0
¡i, then
maxj6=i maxaj2Aj j¹j(aj;tj) ¡ ¹0
j(aj;tj)j = 1. Hence
Z
A¡i
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
¢ui(ai;a
¡
i ;a¡i;¿i(ai;¹¡i);t¡i)
"
Y
j6=i
d¹j(¢;tj) ¡
Y
j6=i
d¹
0
j(¢;tj)
#¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
=
¯ ¯ ¯¢ui(ai;a
¡
i ;a
¹
¡i;¿i(ai;¹¡i);t¡i) ¡ ¢ui(ai;a
¡
i ;a
¹0
¡i;¿i(ai;¹¡i);t¡i)
¯ ¯ ¯
£ max
j6=i
max
aj2Aj
j¹j(aj;tj) ¡ ¹
0
j(aj;tj)j:
(C.21)
Using assumption U4 and the fact that ka
¹
¡i¡a
¹0
¡ik · 1, the right hand side of equation
(C.21) can therefore be bounded above:
Z
A¡i
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
¢ui(ai;a
¡
i ;a¡i;¿i(ai;¹¡i);t¡i)
"
Y
j6=i
d¹j(¢;tj) ¡
Y
j6=i
d¹
0
j(¢;tj)
#¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
· ·(ai ¡ a
¡
i )max
j6=i
max
aj2Aj
j¹j(aj;tj) ¡ ¹
0
j(aj;tj)j:
It follows from this that the right hand side of equation (C.18) is bounded above:
¯ ¯ ¯¢Ui(ai;a
¡
i ;¿i(ai;¹
0
¡i);¹
0
¡i) ¡ ¢Ui(ai;a
¡
i ;¿i(ai;¹
0
¡i);¹¡i)
¯ ¯ ¯
·
Z
T¡i
·(ai ¡ a
¡
i )max
j6=i
max
aj2Aj
j¹j(aj;tj) ¡ ¹
0
j(aj;tj)jf(t¡ij¿i(ai;¹
0
¡i))dt¡i
· ·(ai ¡ a
¡
i )max
j6=i
max
aj2Aj
Z
T¡i
j¹j(aj;tj) ¡ ¹
0
j(aj;tj)jf(t¡ij¿i(ai;¹
0
¡i))dt¡i
= ·(ai ¡ a
¡
i )max
j6=i
max
aj2Aj
Z
Tj
j¹j(aj;tj) ¡ ¹
0
j(aj;tj)jfj(tjj¿i(ai;¹
0
¡i))dtj (C.22)
30Assumption D3 requires that f(tjjti) · º; this leads to
¯ ¯ ¯¢Ui(ai;a
¡
i ;¿i(ai;¹
0
¡i);¹
0
¡i) ¡ ¢Ui(ai;a
¡
i ;¿i(ai;¹
0
¡i);¹¡i)
¯ ¯ ¯
· ·(ai ¡ a
¡
i )max
j6=i
max
aj2Aj
Z
Tj
j¹j(aj;tj) ¡ ¹
0
j(aj;tj)jºdtj
· ·º(ai ¡ a
¡
i )max
j2I
max
aj2Aj
Z
Tj
j¹j(aj;tj) ¡ ¹
0
j(aj;tj)jdtj
= ·º(ai ¡ a
¡
i )d(¹;¹
0): (C.23)
Putting equation (C.18) with the inequalities (C.19) and (C.23) together yields
j¿i(ai;¹¡i) ¡ ¿i(ai;¹
0
¡i)j ·
·º
± ¡ ¶!
d(¹;¹
0) (C.24)
where the assumption that ±=! > ¶ is still maintained. Since the above inequality holds
for any i 2 I and any ai 2 Ai, we also have
max
i2I
max
a2Ai
j¿i(ai;¹¡i) ¡ ¿i(ai;¹
0
¡i)j ·
·º
± ¡ ¶!
d(¹;¹
0)
which implies from (C.17) that
d(Á(¹¡i);Á(¹
0
¡i)) ·
·º
± ¡ ¶!
d(¹;¹
0):
Hence Á is a contraction under the metric d(¢;¢) if for ¸ < 1,
·º
± ¡ ¶!
· ¸: (C.25)
Finally, note that if the condition in equation (C.25) is satis¯ed, then ± > ¶! and so
the initial assumption is veri¯ed.
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